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WHAT IS A COMMUNITY?
GROUP RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE SPECIAL CASE OF AFRICAN AMERICANS
TAUNYA LOVELL BANKS*
"We are born into certain groups, others we choose,
and still others choose us. Lifie,] not subject to the call
of groupness,] is as difficult for us to imagine as life
not subject to the individuating call ofpersonhood or to
the sociating call of sociality. "I
INTRODUCTION
In 1992 after a woman reported that she had been robbed in her
home by a young black man, police officers in the predominately
white upstate New York town of Oneonta tried to "locate and
question" every African American or "black" 2 man in the town. The
police lost track of the assailant near the campus of the State
University of New York College at Oneonta (SUCO). 4  The police
requested and SUCO provided them with a list of its black male
* Jacob A. France Professor of Equality Jurisprudence, University of Maryland. The
author thanks Katherine Vaughns and her research assistant, Elizabeth Taylor, class of 2002.
This article is based on a presentation given on March 4, 2000 at MARGINS' inaugural
symposium entitled Individual Rights v. Community Voice.
1. Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1001, 1070 (1983).
2. As I have written elsewhere, I consciously use the term "black" throughout this
article rather than the more current "African American" because the former's adoption in the
1960s during the black power movement was the result of widespread discussion and
consensus, whereas the currently fashionable term, "African American," was the result of
powerful media influences upon American society, including black America. Taunya Lovell
Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1705, 1708 n.12 (2000). As
historian Armstead Robinson said: "For after all, the term African-American precludes the
possibility of a distinctive term for the native African who has become an American citizen."
Armstead Robinson, Introduction, in Afro-American Landmarks in Virginia (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). The names we call ourselves and are called by others have
been a source of tension within the black community. See, e.g., Bettye Collier-Thomas &
James Turner, Race, Class and Color: The African American Discourse on Identity, 14 J. AM.
ETHNIC HIST. 5 (1994) (discussing the history of racial designation of blacks and the
connection between color and class in self-identification).
3. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000). For a discussion of
this case see, Bob Herbert, In America: Breathing While Black, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1999, §
A, at 29.
4. Brown, 221 F.3d at 334.
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students.5 Finding no suspect, over the next several days the police
stopped and questioned more than 200 "'non-white' persons on the
streets and inspect[ed] their hands for cuts." 6 The students on the list
provided by SUCO and the persons approached and questioned sued
alleging that they were targeted because of their race. They claimed
that the police's actions violated their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause.7 Their attorneys
sought class certification for the student plaintiffs and separate
certification for the other plaintiffs.8  The district court granted
certification for the student class, but not the second class. The court
reasoned "that each individual [in the second class] had exyerienced a
separate and factually distinct encounter with the police." Thus, the
second group of plaintiffs had to proceed individually with their claims
even though they were targeted by the police simply because of their
race and gender.' 0
The conduct of the police in Brown v. City of Oneonta is an
extreme example of racial profiling. A more common police practice,
nicknamed "driving while black," targets black motorists. Studies
suggest that black Americans are disproportionately and systematically
stopped by police officers while traveling on the highways.12 The race
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 335.
10. Id. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the equal protection and related statutory
claims, as well as the Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiffs appealed and the appellate court
affirmed the summary judgment for the defendant on the equal protection claim, but reversed
in part the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim. Id.
11. Elin Schoen Brockman, Word for Word: Neology; In the Dictionary Game, Yada
Yada Yada Is Satisfying to Some, Not Others, N.Y. TIMES, August 22, 1999, § 4, at 7 (defining
"DWB," driving while black).
12. See, e.g., Study: Police Stopped Blacks Twice as Often as Whites, THE COURIER-
JOURNAL (LouiSVILLE, KY), October 29, 2000, at I a (noting that black drivers are pulled over
by Louisville, Kentucky, police officers at almost twice the rate of white drivers); Kevin Sack
and Janet Elder, Poll Finds Optimistic Outlook But Enduring Racial Division, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2000, at Al (stating that 42 percent of blacks compared with 3 percent of whites
polled believed they have been stopped by police simply because of their race); Todd S.
Purdum, Los Angeles to Work With US. on Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at A 16 (stating
that the Justice Department entered into consent decrees with police departments in Los
Angeles, Pittsburgh, Steubenville, Ohio, and the New Jersey State Police for targeting black
motorists); Bob Herbert, In America: Hounding The Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1999, § 4,
at 1 (accusing New York City's police of targeting black pedestrians); Richard Weizel, Can
The Police Learn To Be Color Blind?, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1999, § 14CN, at 3 (stating that a
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of the person detained by the police is frequently the only basis for the
action. Courts admit that a proven disparity between the number of
white and black motorists stopped by the police suggests a
constitutional race-based violation.1 Yet too often courts frame these
violations as individual rather than group claims. 14 The law does not
clearly provide a group-based remedy for race-based constitutional
violations. Following western liberal tradition, constitutional rights in
the United States are framed as individual rather than group rights.
Courts, however, routinely recognized group rights. Corporate
entities, which are voluntary communities of shareholders, have
rights. 15 Similarly, trade unions, which are voluntary communities of
workers, have group-based rights to negotiate with employers on
behalf of their members. 16  Likewise, religious and charitable
associations have group-based rights. 17  So do Native American
communities like the Hopi, Navajos, and Cherokees, who are formally
court-ordered study found that 70 percent of motorist stopped by police in Maryland along
Interstate 95 were black).
13. For a discussion of these cases, see Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein,
Pretext Stops And Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New
Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REv. 725 (2000) (stating that courts have held that
race cannot be the sole basis for reasonable suspicion in police detentions); Katheryn K.
Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C.
L. REv 717 (1999) (examining various manifestations of racial profiling); Angela J. Davis,
Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425, 431-32 (1997) (arguing that race is
the defining factor in pretextual traffic stops); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All
Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997) (discussing police stops of black motorists when there is no
reasonable suspicion that the motorists have committed an offense).
14. See, e.g., David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42
CoLuM. L. REv. 727, 730-31 (1942) (noting that defamation law in the United States is framed
in individualistic terms).
15. Santa Clara Co. v. South Pacific Railway, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (holding
corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
16. See Rugemer v. American National Can Company, 217 F. 3d 846 (2000) (holding
that because union members gave their exclusive bargaining rights to the union, the union had
the right to make unilateral decisions).
17. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the Amish religious
community's right to limit their children's public education to preserve community values),
but cf Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (rejecting a claim of a religious right to
polygamous marriages as essential to the preservation of community values); Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding the right of Boy Scouts of America to refuse
membership based on sexual orientation under the organization's First Amendment free
association rights).
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recognized by the federal government and are treated as domestic
sovereign entities. 18  Even activist civil rights organizations have
group rights. 19 So, perhaps it is misleading to say that American law
only protects individual rights.
With the exception of the protection afforded to religious
groups under the First Amendment, 20  positive group rights are
conferred by laws or treaties rather than constitutional mandate. Yet
Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products expressed the once
commonly held belief that the Supreme Court can exercise judicial
review to protect the rights of "discrete and insular" minority groups
21 2from the tyranny of the majority. In theory, at least, racialized22
18. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that the tribal right to
self- governance precludes review of gender discrimination claim); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding the Bureau of Indian Affairs' policy preferring the hiring and
promotion of Indians as a political, not racial policy that benefits only members of federally
recognized Indian tribes), but cf Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000) (holding the
exclusion of non-Hawaiians from voting for Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustees was not
permissible under cases allowing differential treatment of certain members of Indian tribes).
Native Americans who are affiliated with a recognized tribe, like the Navajo or Cherokee, are
members of a political entity. Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination
of 'Race' in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1231, 1238 (1994). As a result, each
tribe constitutes a tightly knit self-governing, culturally homogeneous community.
19. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (declaring that a
state could not order the NAACP to produce its membership lists because it restrains
members' freedom of association rights). Technically, the NAACP was raising a claim on
behalf of its members, acting a representational capacity.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. (1791). The relevant portion of the First Amendment reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." Id.
21. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Some commentators suggest that more recent
Supreme Court decisions, like Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) and
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), mark the erosion or decline of
Carolene Products' focus on class-based invidious discrimination and the substitution of
individualized claims of discrimination. See Garet, supra note I; Darlene C. Goring, Private
Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative Action in the 21st Century, 33 AKRON L. REv. 209
(2000); Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: Affirmative Action and
the Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 DICK. L. REv. 281 (1997); Brent
E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51
(1996).
22. 1 consciously chose to use the word "racialized" rather than the more problematic
word "race" because, as I have written elsewhere, "the term 'race' . . . is not only socially
constructed, but laden with such heavy baggage that it should never be used except in
quotation marks . . . . The notion that race is an objective condition assumes that racial
definitions are constant, although periodic adjustments and reclassifications might be
necessary. In contrast, the notion that race is subjective, an ideological or social construct,
assumes that racial meanings are contextual and fluid. Race is used constantly as a signifier,
but racial meanings constantly change. Thus, racial identities are unstable, and race has no
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minority groups in the United States, particularly blacks, have a right
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from
discrimination or stigmatization by the state. 23  Under the Equal
Protection Clause, the United States Supreme Court strictly scrutinizes
24any type of race-based governmental action.   This protection of
discrete and insular racialized minority groups, however, focuses on
the individual rights of group members and not the groups
themselves.
25
In this essay I join others who argue that discrimination against
people raced2 6  as black in the United States is group-based
meaning except that ascribed to it. Racial identities are being created and recreated everyday."
Banks, supra note 2, at 1707 n. 9.
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (holding that de
jure segregated public schools generated in black children "a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that anti-miscegenation laws stigmatized blacks based on their
membership in a racial minority in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (holding that the Thirteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power to abolish "all badges and incidents of slavery").
24. For examples of strict scrutiny applied to invidious discrimination, see Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and benign
discrimination, see City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469 (1989);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
25. "If one looks to the normative foundations of equal protection, one can understand
why contemporary equal protection theory is not inherently group protective. In fact, the
jurisprudence of equal protection actually renders the law incapable of determining when a
group's rights are being violated and when they are not. Like freedom of speech, equal
protection jurisprudence rests upon either or both of two foundational values: an individual
value and a social value. But the two values here are somewhat different .. . . While the
individual value behind speech is personhood or autonomy, the individual value behind equal
protection is 'equal respect for persons."' Garet, supra note 1, at 1024. As a result, Professor
Garet argues, the individual value of equal respect for persons permits an outcome like
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) where Justice Powell,
writing for the plurality, explicitly rejects the claim that one has to be a member of a "discrete
and insular minority" to qualify for protection under the Equal Protection Clause. 438 U.S. at
288. Garet writes: "Powell contrasted the Bakke program, which violated the 'personal rights'
of individuals who were equally members of the protected classification (i.e., race), to a valid
program that 'treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process."' Garet, supra
note 1, at 1026 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289, 317). He concludes that Cal-Davis'
"preferential admissions policy ... violated a personal right grounded in the basic value of
equal respect for persons because it failed to consider the applicants as individuals, and instead
regarded them as group members alone." Id.
26. I use "race" as a verb throughout this essay to remind readers that race in the United
States is often imposed on some groups of people.
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discrimination. 27 Thus, courts should be open to group-based claims
and remedies. I caution, however, that any group rights based on
African ancestry should only apply in very limited and, perhaps,
extraordinary circumstances because the black community is
increasingly loose-knit and heterogeneous.
In search for an appropriate standard to determine when legal
recognition of black group rights should be triggered, I start with
Beauharnais v. Illinois. In Beauharnais, the United States Supreme
Court speculated that blacks as a group might be defamed. Ultimately,
the Court backed away from the group defamation language in
Beauharnais because it runs counter to constitutional jurisprudence
grounded in the principle of individual rights. So, I turn to
international human rights laws for guidance.
In exploring group-based rights, I ask whether the
contemporary black community fits the definitions of protected groups
developed internationally. I conclude that in most instances, a claim
of group-based rights for people raced as black in the United States
seldom fits the types of claims usually assigned group recognition in
other countries. The racial profiling of blacks may be one of those
exceptional claims. Lastly, I suggest that the loosely knit
heterogeneous group labeled as the black community should push for
legal recognition of limited group-based rights to address these
exceptional cases.
I. BEAUHARNAIS-A POSSIBILITY OF GROUP RIGHTS?
On one occasion the United States Supreme Court appeared to
recognize group rights for black Americans. In 1952, a narrowly
divided Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois upheld a state law making it
unlawful to defame a class of citizens based on race, color, creed, or
religion. 28  The original defendant in Beauharnais published and
27. See Reva B. Seigel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness"
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 77 (2000)
(arguing that color blindness standards do not adequately take into account group
discrimination); john a. powell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a
Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 99 (1997) (arguing that race-neutral
terms such as equal opportunity have overtly racist historical underpinnings that are used to
enforce exclusionary practices against minority groups).
28. Id.
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exhibited lithographed leaflets portraying black Americans as
depraved, sexually promiscuous, rapists, robbers, carriers of guns and
knives, and users of marijuana.29 The leaflets called on white citizens
of Chicago to petition the mayor and city council to maintain
residential segregation. Attached to each leaflet was a membership
application for the White Circle League of America.
30
Beauhamais was arrested for violating a state criminal libel
law.31 He was convicted and fined $200. On appeal Beauharnais
argued that the state law violated the free speech and press guarantee
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was too vague.32 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
conviction,33 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.34
Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the five-person majority,
reasoned that because it was libelous to characterize an individual as a
rapist, robber, carrier of guns and knives, or user of marijuana, it was
conceivable that a group, in this case Negroes, also could be
defamed.35 According to the majority, if the utterance would "incite
violence and breaches of the peace," the defamatory statement
deprived members of the defamed group an equal right to exercise
their liberties.3 6 Thus, the majority concluded that the state law was
directed at a defined evil, and drawn from the history and practice of
Illinois and other states.
37
Despite insufficient evidence at common law that certain
groups could be defamed, the majority concluded that a state may
prosecute defamatory utterances directed at groups. The majority
29. Id. at 252.
30. Id. The White Circle League of America described themselves as "[t]he only white
voice in America being raised in protest against [Niegro aggressions and infiltration into all
white neighborhoods." People v. Beauharnais, 408 I11. 512, 514, 97 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1951).
31. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 47 (1949) (current version at ILL. CONST., Art. 1, § 20
(2000)). The statute forbid publication of material that "portrays depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which ...
exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or
which is productive of breach of the peace or riots."
32. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251.
33. People v. Beauharnais, 408 Ill. 512, 97 N.E.2d 343 (1951).
34. Id., cert. granted, 342 U.S. 809 (1951).
35. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258, 263.
36. Id. at 261.
37. Id. at 253.
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determined that the state has an interest in protecting the peace and
well-being of the community. 38 Thus, the majority reasoned that there
was no constitutional violation because all states have well-defined
defamation laws restricting speech. These laws reach only a narrow
class of speech which has slight social value.39 Analogizing the right
of groups not to be defamed to group rights for trade unions, the Court
said that legal recognition of group rights need not be restricted to the
economic sphere.4 0  The Court hastened to add, however, that group
libel claims are limited to situations where the coercive activities of
others would "incite violence and breaches of the peace."4' Otherwise,
members of libeled groups are denied equal liberty rights.
Although four members of the Court dissented, three of them
agreed that states have the power to pass group libel laws. Only
Justice Hugo Black disagreed, taking his well-known stance that the
free speech guarantee is an absolute prohibition on government
restraint on speech.42 Briefly, the Beauharnais case suggested the
possibility of group-based rights for racial minorities and outsider
groups under the Constitution. Subsequent Court rulings, however,
have cast doubt on the continuing vitality of the decision.
4W
In Collin v. Smith, for example, a federal appellate court struck
down an ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of material that
38. The Court relied heavily on a past history of racial violence in the area, citing two
incidents: the May 28, 1917, riot in East St. Louis which was preceded by a vehemently
defamatory speech by a prominent lawyer to a group of unemployed workmen; and the 1919
Chicago race riots which were caused by literature circulated by real estate associations. Id. at
258-262.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 262-3. "[E]conomic rights of an individual may depend for the effectiveness of
their enforcement on rights in the group.., to which he belongs." Id. at 262.
41. Id. at 261-62.
42. Id. at 268 (Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Black's position on the
First Amendment, see RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, 20.7, 20.32 (3d ed. 1999); Patricia R.
Stembridge, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection For The Fringe, 80 B.U. L.
REv. 907, 912 (2000) (arguing that Justice Black was the first and most famous First
Amendment absolutist); Mark Oring and S.D. Hampton, When Rights Collide: Hostile Work
Environment vs. First Amendment Free Speech, 31 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 135, 157-58 (2000)
(stating that Justice Black was the most prominent speech absolutionist who was fond of
stating no law meant no law).
43. Several commentators and courts have asserted that Beauharnais has been implicitly
overruled by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that libelous
statements are not immune from First Amendment standards). See, for example, Nadine
Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have To Choose Between Freedom Of
Speech and Equality?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 449, 459 n.41 (1996).
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would promote and incite hatred toward persons on the basis of their
"race, national origin, or religion."a  The City of Skokie, Illinois,
argued that the ordinance in Collin was similar to the statute upheld by
the Supreme Court in Beauharnais.4 5 The appellate court rejected the
city's argument, reasoning that speech which tends to induce breach of
the peace traditionally falls outside the First Amendment's
protection.46  Thus, according to the appellate court, the Supreme
Court's ruling rested heavily on the "strong tendency of the prohibited
utterances to cause violence and disorder," and Illinois's history of
racial strife.4 7 In addition, the federal appellate court expressed strong
doubts about the continuing validity of Beauharnais in light of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
Nine years later, another federal appellate court addressed
Beauharnais' continuing validity more directly in Dworkin v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.49  Hustler magazine published a series of sexually
explicit cartoons referring to the plaintiff, Andrea Dworkin, a well-
known feminist activist, as a lesbian, among other things. 50 The
complaint alleged that Dworkin and other feminist anti-pornography
leaders "were afraid to exercise their rights to speak out against
pornography because if they did, they risked vile and cruel portrayals
44. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). The National Socialist Party, a Nazi political group
that wanted to march in front of the city hall in Skokie, Illinois, challenged several ordinances
that prohibited their march. Id.
45. Id. at 1204.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1205. The court cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268
(1964) (saying it was not persuaded by prior decisions holding that libel was not protected
speech) and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 65, 82 (1964). Id.
49. 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989).
50. Id. at 1190-91. Dworkin's complaint described the cartoon in the February 1984
issue as "depict[ing] two women engaged in a lesbian act of oral sex with the caption, 'You
remind me so much of Andrea Dworkin, Edna. It's a dog-eat-dog world."' The March issue
of the magazine contained a 10 page feature with photographs of women engaged in sexual
acts including acts of lesbianism or masturbation and staged scenes of sexual violence. In one
photograph of a supposedly Jewish male the caption read: "While I'm teaching this little
shiksa the joys of Yiddish, the Andrea Dworkin Fan Club begins some really serious suck-n-
squat. Ready to give up the holy wafers for matzoh, yet guys." The December issue included
as part of the "Porn from the Past" section a cartoon showing a man performing oral sex on an
obese woman while he masturbates. Part of the caption read: "We don't believe it for a
minute, but one of our editors swears that this woman in the throes of ecstasy is the mother of
radical feminist Andrea Dworkin." Id.
2001]
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of themselves such as were levied against Andrea Dworkin and Gloria
Steinem. ' s
In Dworkin, two of the plaintiffs claimed that Hustler's
publication of satirical sexual references to Dworkin and Steinem
impaired their associational rights and restrained their political
freedom. 52  The appellate, court responded that these allegations
amounted to a group libel claim similar to the claim asserted in
Beauharnais, a case that has been "substantially undercut" by later
cases. 53 Ultimately, the court decided the issue on another unrelated
ground.54
More recently, the Court in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul
Minnesota,55 a hate speech case, indirectly addressed the continuing
validity of Beauharnais. Members of the Court in R.A. V. cited
Beauharnais several times. First, Justice Scalia, writing for the
plurality, cited Beauharnais noting that historically, defamation was
speech with "such slight social value" that it should not be permitted.56
He added, however, that "earlier Courts did not mean their repeated
statements that certain categories of expression are 'not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech,"' and again cited Beauharnais
57and several other cases.
51. Id. at 1200. Dworkin also argued that "the persistent attacks on [her] and other
feminist anti-pornography leaders, .... intimidated [appellants] and chilled their exercise of
their own free speech rights." Id.
52. Id. at 1191. "Moree and Fouts claim that publication of the Features: 'is tantamount
to a direct assault upon the rights and interests' of Moree, Fouts, and the relevant chapters of
NOW; 'has caused actual damages' to those persons and their associational rights, and causes
irreparable harm to those persons; and 'makes other women afraid to exercise [political
freedoms on behalf of women] for fear of an ugly, pornographic representation of them
appearing in such a magazine."' Id.
53. Id. at 1200. "To the extent that Beauharnais can be read as endorsing group libel
claims, it has been so weakened by subsequent cases such as New York Times [v. Sullivan]
that the Seventh Circuit has stated that these cases 'had so washed away the foundations of
Beauharnais that it cannot be considered authoritative' .... We agree with the Seventh Circuit
that the permissibility of group libel claims is highly questionable at best. Accordingly, we
share the district court's skepticism that Moree and Fouts were properly joined in this action."
Id.
54. Id. The court held that Hustler Magazine was not a state actor, and thus the
plaintiffs did not state a valid First Amendment claim. Id.
55. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that a statute punishing the display of racial hate
symbols constituted content discrimination in violation of the free speech guarantee).
56. Id. at 383 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
57. Id. In addition to the Beauharnais case the Court also cited Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 483 ('1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of America, 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984). Id.
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Justice White, concurring in the judgment, took issue with
Justice Scalia's conclusions. White wrote that the statements in the
cases that Scalia cited, including Beauharnais, "meant precisely what
they said ... the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance., 5 8  White added, however, "[w]hile we once declared that
libelous utterances [are] not . . . within the area of constitutionality
protected speech [citing Beauharnais], our rulings in [subsequent
cases] have substantially qualified this broad claim." 59 Because the
meaning of these words is unclear, R.A. V does not resolve questions
about Beauharnais' status.
The Court in R.A. V. struck down the state statute because it
singled out a certain type of speech for prosecution and thus was not
content neutral.6 ° Subsequent decisions, however, have limited the
scope of R.A. V 61  Therefore, it is still possible, although highly
unlikely, that a group-based claim might withstand the Court's
scrutiny. Such a claim would have to be based on a properly drawn
statute that does not single out a disfavored subject matter.
58. Id. at 400-01. Joining in Justice White's concurrence were Justices O'Connor,
Blackmun, and Stevens.
59. Id. at 427-28 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985)).
60. Id. at 386-87.
61. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (R.A.V. "involved a First
Amendment challenge to a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of 'fighting words' that
insult, or provoke violence, 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."' Id.
National Endowment For The Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). "In R.A.V. . . . we
invalidated on its face a municipal ordinance that defined as a criminal offense the placement
of a symbol on public or private property 'which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion,
or gender' . . . That provision set forth a clear penalty, proscribed views on particular
'disfavored subjects,' and suppressed 'distinctive ideas, conveyed by a distinctive message.'
In contrast, the 'decency and respect' criteria do not silence speakers by expressly 'threatening
censorship of ideas."' Id. at 582-83. (Citations omitted.)
62. See Joseph W. Lash, Wisconsin v. Mitchell & R.A. V. v. St. Paul: Developing a
Constitutional Test For Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1653, 1669 (1994)
(arguing that ethnic intimidation statutes that are content neutral and punish conduct would
survive First Amendment scrutiny); Sarah G. Vincent, Book Note, The Hate Within
Ourselves: Criminal Law's Attempt to Overcome Bias, 16 HARV. BLACK LETTER J. 229, 242
(2000) (reviewing FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW (1999)) (examining Lawrence's argument that a statute that first reviews the
intent of the defendant to commit the crime and then examines the defendant's motivation
would pass First Amendment scrutiny because the defendant who solely uses hate speech will
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Two commentators point out that the statute upheld in
Beauharnais was quite different from the statute struck down in R.A. V
Although both statutes prohibit certain forms of speech, "the hate
speech at issue in R.A. V. is opinion and thus, its truth is of no concern
to the courts. In contrast, the speech at issue in Beauharnais which is
declared as fact, is blatantly untrue." 63 These commentators speculate
that even after R.A. V., a statute that prohibits "the publication of
untruthful propaganda against social, racial or religious groups [and
that] gives rise to public ridicule or discrimination" would satisfy
R.A. V 's content neutral requirement.
64
Even if Beauharnais has some continuing validity, there are
practical problems with using it to support group-based constitutional
rights for black Americans. A close reading of the case discloses a
decision firmly based on notions of individual rights. The Court links
social nature, economic ability, and individual reputation to the
individual's affiliation with any targeted group. In addition, most
courts refuse to recognize an individual civil action where the group
libeled is large, unless the plaintiff can establish that the libel referred
directly to her.65  Thus, black Americans may be too large and too
diverse a group to fit within the traditional tort group libel framework.
Further, since group libel laws were intended to curb a certain
type of expression-hate speech6 6 -they have been criticized as
be protected because he lacked the intent to commit the parallel crime).
63. Astrid A.M. Mattijssen and Charlene L. Smith, Dutch Treats: The Lessons the US
Can Learn From How The Netherlands Protects Lesbians and Gays, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
303, 320 (1996) (discussing hate speech directed at gays and lesbians).
64. Id. The commentators explain as the reason for Beauharnais' demise, that the
Illinois statute "was designed to thwart actions capable of inducing violence." Id.
65. See, e.g., Barger v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D.Cal. 1983),
aff'd, 732 F. 2d 163 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984) (denying recovery to
members of a group larger than 25); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(dismissing complaint by 30 of the 382 saleswomen at the department store Neiman-Marcus.
Defendants asserted in a book that the stores saleswomen were call girls.); Noral v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 104 P.2d 860 (Cal. App. 1940) (denying claim of one of 162 labor union
officers because the plaintiff failed to establish that the libel referred to him). For a discussion
of group libel see, Jeffrey S. Bromme, Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors, 64 TEXAS L.
REv. 591 (1985).
66. Note, Group Libel Laws: Abortive Efforts To Combat Hate Propaganda, 61 YALE L.
J. 252, 253 (1952). Without question the 1937 New Jersey statute was enacted in response to
the growth of the German-American Bund." Id. at 256. It was subsequently declared
unconstitutionally vague in State v. Klapprott, 22 A.2d 877 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1941). The
Massachusetts statute, sponsored by the American Jewish Congress, specifically targeted
racial and religious hate speech. Id. at 255 n.15 (citing Note, 28 MASs. L. Q. 104 (1943)).
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constitutionally suspect. Some commentators argue that group libel
laws constitute prior restraints on free speech because the laws are
inherently vague about what constitutes a prohibited expression. 67 In
addition, there are other non-constitutional problems with these laws.
Group libel laws were enacted to prevent individuals from
escaping liability for defamation by targeting groups instead of
individuals.68 These laws, however, are easily evaded if the statements
are proved at least partially true.69 Therefore, group libel laws may be
an ineffective means of curbing racial hate speech. Even where the
speech tends to provoke imminent violence, some prosecutors are
reluctant to charge, and some jurors reluctant to convict, hate speech
offenders.
70
Given the constitutional and practical problems with group
libel laws, the demise of Beauharnais may not be a great loss. Yet, the
difficulties inherent in group defamation laws do not necessarily apply
to all group-based rights designed to address racial or religious
discrimination. As mentioned at the outset, American courts routinely
recognize group rights, explicitly or implicitly. Nevertheless, at least
one constitutional scholar, Michael Klarman, doubts whether the Court
has ever consciously acted to protect minority group rights.
Professor Klarman writes, somewhat cynically, that the Court
only "identifies and protects minority rights when a majority or near
majority of the community has come to deem those rights worthy of
protection."'71 He argues that the Court only protected the free speech
67. See id. at 256 (citing State v. Klapprott, 22 A.2d 877 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1941); Note,
Constitutional Law: Curtailment of Speech Inciting to Race Hatred and Protection of
Minorities, 42 COL. L. REv. 857 (1942)).
68. Id. at 253. Between 1935 and 1949 Congress attempted unsuccessfully to enact
group libel laws. Id. at 255.
69. Id. at 262. Although the defendant in Beauharnais argued on appeal that he was not
permitted to introduce evidence that his statements were true, justified as "fair comment" or
privileged, the Supreme Court dismissed these allegations saying that the defendant never
proffered such evidence at trial. Id. at 264.
70. Note, Group Libel Laws: Abortive Efforts To Combat Hate Propaganda, 61 YALE L.
J. at 253. Other states besides Illinois permitted criminal prosecution of group libel, but these
laws were seldom enforced, and when used met with limited success. Id. at 255-56. The
Beauharnais case was the first conviction under one of these statutes to be upheld by an
appellate court. Id. at 256.
71. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82
VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1996) (arguing that "constitutional adjudication frequently involves the
justices' seizing upon a dominant national consensus and imposing it on resisting local
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rights of racial hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan once public
resistance to the desegregation mandate of Brown v. Board of
Education72 waned.73 Thus, despite Justice Stone's footnote in
Carolene Products suggesting that the Court protects the rights of
minority groups from the majority's tyranny, this role might have been
temporary.7 4 Nevertheless, failing to protect racial minorities usually
benefits racial majorities.
II. GROUP RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Most often American courts have recognized race-based
community or group rights in negative rather than positive ways.
During the colonial period, for example, Virginia taxed the labor of
free black women, but did not tax the labor of free white women.75 By
burdening the labor of free blacks, whites' property rights were
enhanced. Thus, the Virginia law gave free white families a
competitive edge over free black families.
During the antebellum era many states prohibited blacks from
testifying against whites in courts. 7 6  In the latter part of the 19th
century, western states imposed similar restrictions on ethnic
Chinese.77 Laws preventing non-whites from testifying against whites
in criminal and civil matters further enhanced the legal rights of whites
outliers"); See also, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 l-ARv. L. REv. 518 (1980) (arguing that the interests of
blacks and whites converged and therefore the decision in Brown was inevitable).
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
73. Klarman, supra note 71, at 36.
74. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978).
75. 2 William W. Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of the Laws of
Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619, at 267 (1823) (Act of
1668, ch 7). The act of 1642 declared that Negro women were taxable. A 1668 act noted that
doubts had arisen as to whether free Negro women were taxable and stated that they were.
The Act also declared that "[Niegro women, though permitted to enjoy their freedom yet
ought not in all respects to be admitted to a full fruition of the exemptions and impunities of
the English." Id. In other words, the law imposed economic burdens on free black women not
incurred by free white women.
76. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (holding that a statute prohibiting negroes,
mulattoes, and Indians from testifying against whites in criminal proceedings also applied to
testimony by ethnic Chinese).
77. THOMAS D. MoRRis, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 229 (1996)
(stating that the rule prohibiting slaves from testifying against whites in criminal trials
remained in force until the end of slavery).
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as a group. Throughout the era of de jure race-based discrimination,
the Court permitted state and federal governments to enact laws
encouraging discrimination based on membership in a legally defined
racial group.
78
The most famous case preserving invidious race-based
discrimination, Plessy v. Ferguson,9 benefited a racialized group-
whites. In Plessy, Homer Plessy, classified by the Court as black,80
was prosecuted for violating the right of Louisiana whites as a group to
ride in train cars without black passengers. 81 In contrast, causes of
action for violations of modem anti-discrimination laws are framed as
individual, not group, rights, even when there is a systematic pattern of
discrimination based on group membership.
The Court refuses to acknowledge affirmative group rights for
black Americans, yet remains blind to how its actions enhance the
rights and privileges of whites as a group. The resulting white rights
are transparent and the Court's actions consciously or unconsciously
82
78. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a statute requiring railroads
carrying passengers to provide separate but equal accommodations for white or colored races
was not unconstitutional); Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D.C. 50 (1910) (holding that Congress,
which exercises all the functions of a state legislature in the District of Columbia, has power to
provide for the separation of white and colored children in the public schools); Gong Lum v.
Rice, 139 Miss. 760, affd, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (holding that a Chinese American citizen was
not denied equal protection of law by requiring attendance at a colored school furnishing equal
educational facilities); Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass) 198 (1849) (holding that a
city provision that required African American children to attend a separate school opened
exclusively for their use was constitutional); Pace v. State of Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)
(holding that a statute that prohibited adultery and fornication between the races is
constitutional even though the penalty for that offense is more severe than if the offense was
committed by members of the same race); but c.f, Loving v. Commonwealth, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (holding that the miscegenation statutes adopted by Virginia to prevent marriages
solely on the basis of race violated the equal protection and due process clauses).
79. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
80. Although the discussion of race and race relations is a fundamental part of the case,
Homer Plessy's race was never listed in the state criminal proceedings. He simply was
charged with "going into a coach used by the race to which he did not belong." Only on
appeal did Mr. Plessy assert that he was an octoroon in whom "the mixture of colored blood
was not discernible." Based on this statement, the Court concluded that Homer Plessy was not
white, but a member of the "colored race." CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE 'PLESSY' CASE: A
LEGAL HISTORIcAL INTERPRETATION 54-55 (1987).
81. Plessy, 163 U.S. at538.
82. Charles Lawrence, The Id, The Ego And Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STANFORD L. REV. 317, 322, 387 (1987) (arguing that equal
protection jurisprudence only addresses intention racism, not the more common unconscious
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preserve white racial preferences in almost every walk of life. 3 To
counter the long history of laws designed to protect whites' property
interest in their whiteness,8 4 limited recognition of group rights for
racial, religious, and other subordinated groups with a history of
legalized discrimination seems warranted. Yet, contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence makes these arguments difficult.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,85 Columbia law Professor Herbert Wechsler wrote a
controversial article questioning Brown's rationale. 86  In the article
Professor Wechsler argued that a stronger basis for the decision is
found in the constitutional freedom of association guarantee. Using
this theory he argued that racially segregated schools denied African
American students the right to associate with whites in a public school
setting, but acknowledged that each group also has the right not to
associate with other groups.8 7 His argument leaves unanswered how
the rights of one group may, in some circumstances, be greater than
another group. Instead, his argument illustrates the tension between
racism).
83. Barbara Flagg calls this phenomenon "white racial transparency." Barbara J. Flagg,
"Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993).
84. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 100 HLAv. L. REV. 1709 (1993)
(arguing that whites historically and presently have a property interest in their white skin
because it confers certain economic privileges denied to non-whites).
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding de jure racially segregated public schools
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
86. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959). In the article Professor Wechsler argues that the Court did not have strong
evidence to support the petitioner's claim that racially segregated schools harmed black
children; and thus the Court based its decision on the view that "racial segregation is, in
principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed; that is, the group that
is not dominant politically and, therefore, does not make the choice involved." Wechsler
continues that this argument is "untenable" because it required courts to inquire into
legislative motive, something courts usually try to avoid. Id. at 33.
87. Id. at 34.
88. See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 29 (2000) (arguing that Wechsler saw no way to choose between free association
claims of blacks and whites; therefore, any principle that would strike down racial segregation
of public schools would also invalidate single-sex bathrooms in state buildings); Nan D.
Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 18 (2000) (pointing to a case where the court allowed a private group sponsoring a parade to
exclude a gay group from participating by framing the issue as whether a private group would
be required to include marchers who conveyed a message they did not want to convey, thus
converting the issue into a First Amendment issue, which trounced the equality claims of the
gay group); Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REv.503, 521
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liberty and equality rights under the Constitution, left unresolved by
the Court in Brown.
Professor Wechsler's argument also reminds us that Brown
operates as a constraint on community or group rights. The Brown
rationale calls into question any law that appears to prefer one racial
group over another. 89  Thus, Justice Scalia, concurring in Adarand,
where the Court invalidated a minority set-aside provision, could
write: "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American."
90
Recent anti-discrimination laws that seem to be based on
membership in a protected group are illusory. For example, Title II of
the Civil Rights Act prohibits race discrimination in public
accommodations that affect interstate commerce. 91 Title VII of the
same act prohibits discrimination in employment based on sex, race,
color, religion, or national origin.92  Violations of both laws are
contingent on discrimination based on membership within one of the
protected groups. Yet these anti-discrimination protections, and most
recognized group rights stem from individual, not actual, group rights.
Free exercise of religion, for example, is framed in the
Constitution as an individual right.93  Nevertheless, court decisions
often recast this constitutional guarantee as a group right because of
(1997) (stating that Wechsler does not take into account that in some instances black
Americans' rights will have to be considered above others); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising
Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 153 (1986) (arguing that Wechsler's argument that both
blacks and whites had the right of free association did not take into account that if whites
choose to exercise their rights to the exclusion of blacks, free association could not be made
available to both groups); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 530-31 (1980) (arguing that black
children need greater protection from discriminatory practices of school systems, such as
higher suspension and expulsion rates, than integration systems can offer).
89. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1991); Andreas Auer, Public School Desegregation and the
Color-Blind Constitution, 27 Sw. L.J. 454, 458-59 (1973) (arguing post-Brown per curiam
decisions support color blind interpretation of Brown).
90. Adarand Constructors at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1994).
92. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
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shared religious beliefs among subsets of the American population. 94
So perhaps most so-called group rights under the Constitution are
illusory.
Therefore, a strategy of protecting group rights through United
States constitutional jurisprudence is inherently limited. Thus, it
appears impossible for any constitutional regime to guarantee at once a
minority group's survival and the most fundamental rights of an
individual dissident within that group. 95 This has led some scholars to
look beyond the U.S. Constitution to international human rights law
for a means of protecting group rights. In contrast to American laws'
focus on individual rights, international human rights laws often are
framed in terms of group rights.
III. GROUP RIGHTS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS
American law tends to value the right to free expression over
the right to equal treatment and the protection of individuals rather
than groups. Other countries seem better able to strike a balance
between these conflicting interests. For example, in Holland when a
gay nurse sued a religious leader for making hateful statements
directed against gays and lesbians, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that
a person's right to equal treatment outweighed a defendant's right to
freedom of speech.9 6 Holland is better positioned to strike this balance
between equal treatment and free speech because communicative
94. For a discussion of recasting individual rights as group rights, see, Michel
Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge The Gap Between Universalism And Relativism? A
Pluralist Assessment Based On The Rights Of Minorities, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 249,
256-57 (1999).
95. Id at 254. Professor Cass Sunstein argues that liberty (free speech) and equality can
co-exist and be quite compatible depending on how the terms are defined. Cass R. Sunstein,
The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2411 (1994).
96. Mattijssen & Smith, supra note 63 at 307. A leader of a small militant religious
group distributed an article in a pamphlet throughout the nation. The article contained hateful,
derogatory statements directed at homosexuals. For example: "Now that homosexuality has
been legalized, the new death appears. It is the result of sin: AIDS! ... A consequence of
homosexuality is AIDS which, without possibility of appeal, brings about death .... Being a
lesbian is rewarded. AIDS passes by the door of lesbian women. At the moment, anyway.
Ten years ago, the homosexuals were rewarded like this. They didn't have AIDS .... God
lets no-one (sic) ridicule him. Those who practice homosexuality incur a blood-guilt
comparable to a murderer. He deserves the death penalty." Id. at 303.
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speech is under the control of the government.97  By law, Holland,
unlike the United States, can prohibit content-specific speech.98 As a
result, plaintiffs in Holland may recover for the dignitary harms caused
by hate speech.99 In contrast, Americans, inherently suspicious of
government, are loath to grant government much power to affect the
public expression of ideas.
°0
Still other countries, like Canada, are more specific in their
protection of group rights, even at the expense of individual rights.
Section 15 (2)(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
protects from so-called reverse discrimination actions "any law,
program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions
of disadvantaged individuals or groups, including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."''01 The Canadian
Constitution specifically protects language minorities, 0 2 religious
minorities 0 3 and First Nation People (indigenous communities).
As with Holland, however, Canada's relationship with its
citizens is fundamentally different than the relationship of the U.S.
government to its citizens. "The popular understanding of the social
contract between the [U.S.] government and its citizens tends to
reinforce the idea that freedom is best promoted by a non-
97. Id. at 306.
98. Id. at 318-19. Under Dutch law, anyone who in public, orally or through writing or
illustration, insults a group of persons on account of their race, religion or belief, or hetero- or
homosexual orientation, is subject to one year in prison and a fine. A law of this kind in the
United States would presumably contradict the First Amendment. In the United States, statutes
may limit the use of fighting words, but must also be content-neutral. Id.
99. Id. at 331. For an article raising the same argument in the context of American tort
law see, Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982).
100. See Mattijssen & Smith, supra note 63, at 308.
101. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 15(2)(1). The first subsection of § 15 reads: "Every individual is equal before
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." Id. at § 15(1).
102. The Canadian Constitution officially recognizes two languages (English and
French), and cultures (English and French). Id. at §§ 16-23.
103. Id. at § 15(2)(1).
104. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act of 1982), pt. II (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canadian), § 35. See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 1, 23, 25, 27, 28.
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interventionist state."'10 5 Thus, absent a constitutional amendment, it is
unlikely that state or federal government in the United States could
enact legislation similar to Holland or Canada without running afoul of
the U.S. Constitution.
Even those universal declarations of human rights that might
afford some protection for group rights are not effective mechanisms
to address racial subordination in the United States. First, international
human rights laws typically confer group protection to communities
that are subordinated due to conquest or colonialization. 10 6 But even if
black Americans could qualify as a protected group, there are more
fundamental obstacles.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although
permitting governments to impose restrictions on hate speech in the
name of equality, 10 7 does not displace U.S. constitutional law. The
105. Colleen Sheppard, Equality Rights And Institutional Change: Insights From Canada
and The United States, 15 ARIZ. J. INTL & CoMp. L. 143, 159 (1998) (citing Owen M. Fiss,
Why the State, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1987); CARL LOTUs BECKER, FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 7-8 (1945).
106. S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights
Law: Towards a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REv. 309 (1994). Over
the last two decades, the international community has established indigenous peoples or
populations as special subjects of international concern within its burgeoning human rights
program. Id at 336. See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary
International Law 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COmvp. L. 1 (1991) (discussing the development of
indigenous group rights under international law).
107. The Declaration does not contain a specific anti-hate speech provision. The equal
protection provision, Article 19, guarantees freedom of expression. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
contains a limitation on speech that incites any discrimination. Article 29 restricts freedom of
expression where needed "to secure recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and to protect the public." The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
contains similar provisions. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976 [hereinafter
Civil and Political Rights Covenant]. Likewise, Article 19(3) limits free expression in a
manner similar to the Universal Declaration. Article 20 provides that "any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law." The American Convention on Human Rights contains a
similar provision. Article 13(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, OEA/Ser. L./V/1I.23 Doc. Rev. 2, entered into force
July 18, 1978 [hereinafter American Convention] reads:
Any ... advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to lawless violence or to any other similar illegal action against
any person or group of persons on any ground including those of race,
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United States is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, but signed the declaration reserving certain rights. 08 The U.S.
agreed to the declaration to the extent that its provisions are not
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution. 10 9 As a result, human rights
color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses
punishable by law.
An even more detailed restriction on hate speech appears in Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Article 4 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan.
4, 1969 [hereinafter CERD Convention] (requiring governments to outlaw "all dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred" as well as "organizations... which promote and
incite racial discrimination"). In addition, Article 10 of the European Convention contains a
limitation on freedom of expression that has been interpreted to prohibit hate speech. Article
10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 [hereinafter
European Convention].
108. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); The Universal Declaration was drafted to be an aspirational non-
binding common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. Frank E.L. Deale,
The Unhappy History of Economic Rights in the United States and Prospects for Their
Creation and Renewal, 43 How. L.J. 281, 313 (2000) (citing Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 131, 137 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997)).
Subsequently, several binding covenants have been passed to implement the principles of the
Universal Declaration. However, the United States has imposed reservations on its ratification
of international human rights conventions and as a result has adopted very few. Id at 312-20.
109. Amendments by Senator Bricker in the 1950s sought to make it nearly impossible
for the United States to adopt human rights treaties. Id. at 318. The Bricker Amendment
imposed reservations on the ratification of any human rights treaty that continue to form the
basis for opposition to ratification:
Sec. 1: A provision of a treaty that denies or abridges any right
enumerated in this Constitution shall not be of any force or
effect.
Sec. 2: No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or
any international organization to supervise, control, or
adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States within the
United States enumerated in this Constitution or any other
matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States,
Sec. 3: A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the
United States only though the enactment of appropriate
legislation by the Congress.
Sec. 4: All Executive and other agreements between the
President and any international organization, foreign power, or
official thereof shall be made only in the manner and to the
extent prescribed by law. Such agreements shall be subject to
the limitations imposed on treaties, or the making of treaties, by
this article.
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law cannot be used to undermine existing U.S. constitutional law
which favors free expression over equal treatment. Thus, international
human rights law may be helpful only as guides to the difficult
problem of determining group membership.
IV. PROBLEMS DETERMINING GROUP MEMBERSHIP
A. Generally
The foregoing discussion about protecting the individual's
freedom of expression while ensuring equality of subordinated
communities illustrates the difficulty in reconciling these two often
competing interests. 110 In addition to this fundamental conflict, there
always are definitional problems in determining which communities
constitute protected groups. Further, legally defined groups tend to
lack the fluidity of real life community affiliations. Communities are
created in various ways that law often overlooks. Robin Fields asserts,
In a given society, individuals are often members of a
large number of distinct groups. These groups may,
and often do, constitute a "minority" in relation to other
groups within the larger society. Similarly, a "majority"
group is often comprised of a number of individuals
who in and of themselves are members of different
"minority" groups with particular interests. Despite the
apparent fluidity of this broad conception of "group,"
the classification has been used in many nations as a
fixed method of allocating citizenship rights. As such,
group membership becomes problematic when
individuals, on the basis of something seemingly as
Id. at 319 n.240 (citing Natalie Hevener Kaufman, HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE
SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 66, 96-103, 201-3 (1990)).
110. For a discussion of this point see Stephanie Farrior, Molding The Matrix: The
Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14
BERKELEY J. INTL L. 1, 13 (1996) (arguing that there is a tension between ensuring equality
and eliminating discrimination and preventing potential governmental abuse of its power to
restrict free expression).
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permanent as race, are excluded or denied certain
citizenship rights. "'1
One critic of Canada's categorization of discrimination
expressed similar concerns. He argues that people who "do not fall
neatly into one of the established categories... may be excluded from
the Charter's promise of 'equal protection and equal benefit of the
law.,012 Thus, it is difficult to develop an accurate, yet fluid definition
of community when trying to provide legal protection for racially
subordinated groups.
Two groups protected under Canada's Charter, religious
minorities and First Nation People, seem similar to the problematic
group classifications found in American law. Canada's protection of
religious minority groups may simply be a recasting of individual
rights of religious freedom into a group-based right. The treatment
and status of First Nation groups is analogous to Native American
communities in the United States.1 13  So, arguably, the same
justifications and limitations apply.
Only the protection afforded Canadian language minorities
seems remotely similar to racialized communities in the United States.
Language minorities, like French-speaking Canadians living in
111. Robin M. Fields, In Search Of Democracy: Reconciling Majority Rule, Minority
Rights, and Group Rights In South Africa and the United States, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
65, 73 (1996) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Voting Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1994, at 36-7;
Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 270-71
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); Adeno Addis, Individualism,
Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv'. 615, 650
(1992); Bronwen Manby, South Africa: Minority Conflict and the Legacy of Minority Rule, 19
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFs., Winter/Spring 1995, at 51; DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC
SOUTH AFRICA? 23-4, 47 (1991); HERBERT ADAM AND KOGILA MOODLEY, THE OPENING OF
THE APARTHEID MIND: OPTIONS FOR THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 2-3 (1993); Charles Lawrence,
Forward Ace, Multiculturalism and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV.
819, 835 (1995)).
112. Douglas Kropp, 'Categorical Failure': Canada's Equality Jurisprudence -
Changing Notions Of Identity And The Legal Subject, 23 QUEEN'S L. J. 201, 201 (1997).
Professor Kropp writes: "One consequence of categorizing is that characteristics associated
with the various categories come to be 'regarded as wholly constitutive of that group's social
identity,' thus overlooking and obscuring differences within categories." Id. at 208-09. For a
similar argument about the problem with a rigid race-based category, see Banks, supra note 2.
113. See Matthew S.R. Palmer, International Law/Intercultural Relations, I CHI. J. INT'L
L. 159, 161-63 (2000).
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English-speaking Canadian provinces, warrant limited protection
based on an easily determined characteristic. French-speaking
Canadians see themselves as a culturally different minority. Language
is just one indicia of their group membership. Geography also plays a
part in defining this community. Quebec Province is linguistically and
culturally French. As a result, there has been continuous hostility by
English-speaking Canadians toward French-speaking Canadians.
The difficulty inherent in defining community may explain
why the international human rights community does not have a
consistent definition or standard for determining what constitutes a
subordinated group under international law. Several factors seem
important: (1) indicia of membership, (2) degree of community
organization, and (3) degree of group acceptance by the dominant
community. In international human rights law an overriding
characteristic of minority communities is their existence in a
"disadvantageous situation." 14  A disadvantageous situation is
described "as those circumstances where persons belonging to a
minority group are required to exert greater efforts than those members
of the majority to participate in everyday life."'"15
114. Andras B. Baka, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of
Minorities Under International Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 232 (1993). Robin Fields
writes:
In addition, other factors that have been cited which could be considered
defining characteristics of a minority group include such objective and
subjective criterion as: existence of a distinct group, numerical proportion,
non-dominance, being a nationality of the state, existence within the state,
a sense of community, collective goals and wills, and self-identification.
[Citing Malcolm N. Shaw, The Definition of Minorities in International
Law, in PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 23-30 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala
Tobory eds., 1992).] An expressly held belief by the majority that a
particular group is inferior to the majority group, which subsequently
perpetuates low self-esteem and self-hatred by the subordinated group, is a
critical factor to consider when determining the existence of a minority
group [citing JAY A. SIGLER, MINORITY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 5 (1983)]. Although Blacks in South Africa fulfilled much of
the criterion for minority group protection, the fact that they constituted a
majority within the population required the United Nations regime to
create a special category of protection: self-determination for colonized
peoples [citing Bronwen Manby, South Africa: Minority Conflict and the
Legacy of Minority Rule, 19 FLETCHER F. World AFF., Winter/Spring
1995, at 31].
Robin M. Fields, supra note 11, at 75 n.43.
115. Id. at 75 (citing Baka, supra note 114, at 233).
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On the surface, the racial profiling of black Americans as a
group seems to fit within this definition. Blacks are identified and
targeted based on skin tone and phenotypical characteristics. There
are established political and social organizations that promote black
interests and concerns. The long history of past race-based
discrimination and the existence of continuing race-based
discrimination by some whites directed at all blacks suggests that
blacks still are not fully accepted by the dominant community. But, as
the foregoing discussion indicates, minority rights can be constructed
as individual rihts, 116 collective rights, or as some have argued,
societal rights." Given the ongoing concern in the United States
about fully protecting individual rights while simultaneously
protecting minority group rights, 118 it is essential to closely examine
claims of community race-based discrimination when conferring group
rights.
B. The Case of Black Americans
Kesaya Noda, although writing about growing up as a Japanese
American in the U.S., aptly describes the dilemma facing black
Americans. She writes: "How is one to know and define oneself?
From the inside-within a context that is self defined, from a
grounding in community and a connection with culture and history that
are comfortably accepted? Or from the outside-in terms of messages
received from the media and people who often are ignorant?"'"19
Most black Americans are targeted for race-based
discrimination because of highly visible and irrelevant group-based
characteristics. Thus, unlike voluntary associations (i.e., corporations,
religious groups, and trade unions) black Americans are assigned
116. See discussion of group rights in the United States, supra notes 66, 68.
117. Garet, supra note I, at 1001-02.
118. Michael Rosenfeld raises this point in the context of human rights. Michael
Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between Universalism and Cultural
Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities, 30 COL. HUM. RTS.
REV. 249 (1999) (arguing that international human rights should treat minority group rights
from a pluralist perspective).
119. Kesaya E. Noda, Growing Up Asian in America, in MAKING WAVES: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN 243-44 (Asian Women
United of Calif., eds. (1989)).
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group membership by external sources. These external sources usually
are both legal (anti-miscegenation and racial classification laws) and
social. In this sense the black community, like other subordinated
communities, is an involuntary community. Yet many black
Americans will argue persuasively that they are voluntary community
members. Thus, it may be impossible to determine whether
community identification for black Americans is voluntary or
externally imposed because there are aspects of both origins in the
creation of the community.
The closeness of the community is another factor to consider
when conferring group rights. Some communities are loosely knit and
very heterogeneous. Often ethnic communities composed of voluntary
immigrants fit this description. Its members come from the same
country and may share a common language and cultural tradition,
depending on the homogeneity of their native country. At the other
end of the spectrum are tightly knit homogeneous communities.
Some religious groups, notably the Amish community, fit this
description.
The black American community fits the former model. It is far
more heterogeneous than many people may want to admit. The
African ancestors of most black Americans were brought to this
country involuntarily, but in many other respects the community today
looks much like other ethnic immigrant communities. 120 A highly
heterogeneous community of people descended from Africans was
created when the enslaved immigrants were raced as "Negro" during
the seventeenth century. 12 1 As a consequence, a uniquely "African"
120. I am not prepared at this point, however, to argue, as some have, that black
Americans should be treated under the law as an ethnic group. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid
Whist, Tonk and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African Americans
Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1415 (1993) (discussing the theory that African Americans
represent a new ethnic group indigenous to North America similar to the Native Americans
but dissimilar because they were forcibly brought here and created here rather than being
found and separated from their dominion over the land).
121. Biological anthropologist Fatimah Jackson writes: "African Americans represent a
recent yet highly heterogeneous, regionally diverse macro-ethnic group. Most
anthropological genetic studies to date have tended to emphasize the admixture aspects of
African American biodiversity, focusing on the presence of European marker genes in African
American groups. A careful review, however, of the magnitude of heterogeneity among
various contemporary indigenous groups of west, central, and southwest Africa suggests that
the bulk of African American heterogeneity is rooted in indigenous African variability."
Fatimah Jackson, Concerns and Priorities in Genetic Studies: Insights from Recent African
American Biohistory, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 951, 958 (1997).
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American culture evolved based on the common experiences of
slavery and racial subordination in America. Despite the common
experience of slavery, which ended at different times in different
regions of the country, blacks in the United States are not culturally
homogeneous. The experience of being black in the United States
creates a tenuous community, some might argue that it is a reactive
community created primarily by external factors.
Assuming a community based on racial identification alone
may be overly simplistic. The black community that exists by virtue
of the external factor of white racism differs from other communities
of black members whose community of interests does not revolve
around the experience of racism. Determining the black community
for legal purposes therefore is problematic. There also are definitional
problems. Anyone with known African ancestry is raced as black in
the United States.' 22 Yet, not all of people raced as black considered
themselves black or identify with the black community. Racial
identity, for example, is changeable, even for people raced as black in
the United States. 23
Ethnicity identification often separates black Americans from
each other. The 2000 Democratic Party primary race for New York's
111 h congressional district between the incumbent, Major Owens, an
"African" American, and Una Clarke, a Caribbean American City
Council member, illustrates this point. 124 Over the past eighteen years,
West Indian blacks moved into the district and now account for
twenty-five to forty percent of the population. 125 Some commentators
saw the challenge by Una Clarke as more a matter of ethnicity than
ideology. 126 Explaining the ethnic tensions, sociology professor Philip
122. See Banks, supra note 2, at 1710-11.
123. See, e.g., G. Reginald Daniel, Passers and Pluralists: Subverting the Racial Divide,
in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 91 (Maria Root ed., 1992) (discussing the
phenomenon of "passing"; as racially mixed individuals "make a clandestine break with the
African American community, temporarily or permanently, in order to enjoy the privileges of
the dominant White community"); Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The
Determination of 'Race' in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231 (1994) (discussing
how government entities are charged with determining the race of a person in order to carry
out race-conscious laws).
124. Eleanor Brown, Brooklyn Dispatch. Black vs. Black, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.25,
2000, at 18.
125. Id.
126. Id. During the primary campaign Councilwoman Clarke accused Representative
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Kasinitz, author of Caribbean New York said: "African-Americans
have not translated their gains in the public sector in the way that the
Jews or the Italians did, . . So, when they face the same issues of
ethnic succession, in this case by Caribbeans, it seems that there is
more to lose. And that contributes to the tension."'127 What made this
ethnically charged race different from others was that "both ethnic
groups [were] black."' 128
In addition, sociologist Orlando Patterson predicts that the
black community in the United States will become even more diffused
in the twenty-first century., He writes that the immigration of Afro-
Caribbeans into the United States over the past fifty years, coupled
with the increase in out-group marriage by blacks, will create new
racial groupings and coalitions.' 29  It is unclear whether members of
these new racial groupings and coalitions will see themselves or be
seen by the external dominant community as members of a single
black community.
Today, there is also great variance in socio-economic status
within the black community.' 30  Law professor Patricia Williams
writes that whites tend to conflate race and class, especially when
constructing black stereotypes.' 3 ' According to Professor Williams,
"the term underclass is a euphemism for blackness."' 132  Even black
politicians tend to conflate race and class pushing for policies in the
name of the black community that benefit poor and working class
families, only some of whom may be black. 1
33
Owens of being anti-immigrant. Representative Owens countered "accus[ing] Ms. Clarke of
trying to turn black Brooklynites against one another by using ethnic chauvinism to get votes.
As a result, theirs has not just been a political contest. It has represented a springboard for
many to consider anew the relationship between two groups of black New Yorkers who often
have their own share of prejudices against one another." Jonathan P. Hicks, Bitter Primary
Contest Hits Ethnic Nerve Among Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at Al.
127. Id.
128. Brown, supra note 124. "[Wlhile West Indians generally agree with African
Americans on the issues, their experience as recent immigrants has fostered a radically
different political style." Id. Representative Owens won the Democratic primary race.
Jonathan P. Hicks, New York Primary: The Overview: With Few Exceptions, Incumbents Win
Handily in Primaries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2000, at B I.
129. Orlando Patterson, Race Over, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 10, 2000, at 6.
130. See Salim Muwakkil, Movin' on Apart, IN THESE TIMES, March 22, 1998, at 11.
131. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE 31-
45 (1998).
132. Id. at 34-35. Similarly, the term "middle-class" operates as a euphemism for
whiteness. Id.
133. See Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of
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As my foregoing discussion suggests, notions of community,
however, are not necessarily static. There may be a consensus within a
substantial segment of the so-called black community about the evils of
racial profiling of African American drivers.134 There is not, however,
a uni-perspective or worldview among persons of African descent
about other issues like school vouchers 35or tax cuts. 136  In the latter
case, additional factors like class, education, gender, ethnicity, and
geography create different communities of interests.' 37  Thus,
individual agency is increasingly likely given the increasing socio-
economic and ethnic diversity within and between those Americans
raced as black. Therefore, there may be a contemporary black
community for some purposes but not for other purposes. 138
Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1369, 1442 (1995)
(quoting Leonce Gaiter, The Revolt of the Black Bourgeoisie, N.Y. TIMEs, June 26, 1994, § 6
(Magazine), at 42).
134. See Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV 717 (1999); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and
Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 431-32 (1997); David A. Harris, "Driving While
Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
135. See, e.g., Evan Thomas and Lynette Clemetson, A New War Over Vouchers,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 1999, at 46 (discussing division within the civil rights community over
the value of school vouchers).
136. See Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself. Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV.
647 (1996); Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and
Reality, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 313 (1996).
137. See id.; Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community
in the Post-Shaw Era, 29 VAND. L. REV. 227 (1996). "Transcendent community interests
should not be confused with a simplistic belief that the African-American community is a
monolithic entity in which all people of color live identical lives in every respect, agree with
one another, or even like one another. Nevertheless, color is an immutable physiological fact
packed with cultural, historical, and sociological significance that shapes the contours of
individual daily lives in ways sometimes subtle and sometimes all too brutally clear.
Rhetorical devices that label the recognition of transcendent community interests as
'stereotyping' or 'stigmatizing' are often used to silence important discussions of race that
need to be had." Id. at 235.
138. In addition, Bakke, Hopwood, Croson and Adarand, the so-called reverse
discrimination cases, illustrate how easily legal categories can be manipulated to the detriment
of racially subordinated groups.
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V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Ronald Garet writes:
So long as equal protection jurisprudence is devoted
exclusively to individual and social values, group rights
will be undefined and left unprotected. Equal
protection will actually produce certain group-
protective outcomes, but it will also protect groups
where protection is not called for by any group value.
More importantly, it will fail to protect groups where
that protection is called for by group values.
139
People raced as black in the United States need to acknowledge
that race is not the end all and be all for black Americans.
140
Community membership, even increasingly for people raced as black,
is temporal and transcendent-limited purpose. Thus, we must be
more critical in our assumptions about the existence and nature of the
black community in the United States. Broad legal recognition of
group rights for racially subordinated groups like blacks may be ill
advised.
Although questioning the construction of the racial category
black or African American as a unitary interest group, I nevertheless
urge black Americans to be strategically essentialist on racial
matters. 141 Racial profiling is a good example of an issue that impacts
139. Garet, supra note 1, at 1025.
140. Recently I raised this point in discussing the multi-layered nature of race-based
discrimination experienced by people raced as black in the United States. Banks, supra note 2
(arguing that dark-skinned blacks often experience a harsher form of race-based
discrimination than light-skinned blacks).
141. Leti Volpp writes: "[lt may be useful to practice a 'strategic essentialism'-
strategic, because it is consciously directed toward a political goal, essentialism because it
reinstates some version of the essence of a community, even if only temporarily and for a
political purpose. Spivak discusses the description of a particular poor community by elite
scholars, who after-the-fact interpret, explain and essentialize the community, taking the effect
(the constructed identity) and reading it as a cause (it explains the individuals' actions). She
argues that it may be appropriate for the subaltern Studies Group to, in turn, describe this
community in order to combat the dehumanizing description by elite scholars-all the while
recognizing that, through this process, the subsequent description also essentializes the
community." Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural
Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 95 n.162 (1994) (citing Gayatri Spivak, Subaltern
Studies: Deconstructing Historiography, in IN OTHER WORLDS 197, 205 (1988)).
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all persons raced as black. In the absence of a group-based remedy,
there will be multiple individual legal attacks on racial profiling
practices. Where a strong case for a unitary community interest can be
made, requiring individuals to litigate separately is both expensive and
time consuming. Both plaintiffs and the legal system will suffer and
any relief obtained may be insufficient.
Some narrowly tailored recognition of group rights is needed.
Otherwise race-based practices, like racial profiling, that affect an
entire racialized community will effectively chill freedom of
movement for that segment of the citizenry. Groups of citizens, who
fear traveling on the highways of this country based solely on their
membership in racialized group, are being denied equal protection
under the law when they are unable to secure the legal protection of
their government.

